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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee, 
v. 
RAYMOND VICTOR GARCIA, Case No. 970474 
Appellant. Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this first 
degree felony conviction from the district court. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the trial court's verdict? 
The standard of review of a bench verdict is less deferential than that for a jury 
verdict. The Court assesses the evidence and determines whether the trial court's 
analysis was clearly erroneous, or whether a firm conviction stands that the trial court 
made a mistake. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 , 193 (Utah 1 987). 
This issue was properly preserved in the trial court (e.g. 303-310, 329-341). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The following 1990 constitutional provisions and statutes apply to the offense 
of conviction, which occurred on June 2 1 , 1989: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV §1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any 
watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle 
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on 
business therein and includes: 
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the 
structure or vehicle; and 
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected wi th 
the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwell ing" means a building which is usually occupied by a 
person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually 
present. 
(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises 
when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or 
remaining are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise 
licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof. 
2 
(4) "Enter" means: 
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or 
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of 
the actor. 
Utah Code Ann §76-6-202 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully 
in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony 
or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, 
committ ing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant in 
the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or 
dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same 
definition as under Section 76 -1 -601 . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Mr. Garcia was charged by information with one count of aggravated burglary, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203, and with one count of assault, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 (R. 4-5). The information 
read, in relevant part: 
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COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 3601 South 2700 
West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 1 7, 1 989, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code Annotated 
1 953, as amended in that the defendant, RAYMOND V. GARCIA, a party 
to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the building of J.C. 
Penney, Co., Inc. wi th the intent to commit an assault upon Denese 
Ahrens; and caused physical injury to Denese Ahrens. 
COUNT II 
ASSAULT, a Class B Misdemeanor, at 3601 South 2700 West, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 17, 1989, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, RAYMOND V. GARCIA, a party to the 
offense, assaulted Denese Ahrens by attempting to do bodily injury to 
Denese Ahrens. 
(R. 4). 
Garcia was represented in the trial court by Lynn R. Brown of the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association (R. 66). 
Following the preliminary hearing, the magistrate ordered the case bound over 
to district court (R. 2). 
Judge Murphy presided in the district court, where Mr. Garcia pled not guilty at 
his arraignment (R. 9). Judge Murphy conducted a bench trial, after which he 
convicted Mr. Garcia of aggravated burglary (R. 23). 
On November 5, 1990, Judge Murphy sentenced Mr. Garcia to a term of five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison and ordered him to pay restitution, but stayed the 
prison sentence, granting Mr. Garcia probation (R. 41). 
Following various efforts by Mr. Garcia to pursue his right to appeal, wi th the 
acquiescence of the State, Judge Noel resentenced Mr. Garcia on September 24, 
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1997, and Stephen R. McCaughey filed a timely notice of appeal on Mr. Garcia's 
behalf (R. 104).1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Denese Ahrens testified that she was on her way to work at J.C. Penneys on 
June 17, 1989, at about 7:50, and saw Mr. Garcia standing near the store elevators 
(R. 116-118). 
After they rode down the elevator together, she testified that she heard him 
follow her out of the elevator and down a hallway, and that he eventually put his hand 
over her mouth (R. 120-121, 136). They fell backwards onto the floor (R. 144). 
She hit her head, elbow, and tailbone when she fell, and subsequently suffered 
severe headaches and some arm pain, and required back therapy for three months after 
the fall (R. 122-123). She also suffered from depression and quit her job at Penneys 
as a result of the experience (R. 123). 
After they fell, she screamed and he ran out a nearby emergency door of the 
store (R. 122). 
It was a dark area of the store where Ms. Ahrens was grabbed, but there was 
some light coming in from a nearby emergency door behind the assailant (R. 1 38-1 39). 
1
 As of the filing of this brief, the order underlying the resentencing of 
Mr. Garcia are missing from the district court pleadings file. Simultaneously with 
the filing of the opening brief, Appellant's counsel is in the process of 
supplementing the record with this order, to complete the record on appeal. 
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She testified that she was not looking at him when he grabbed her and they struggled, 
but that she saw him briefly as they fell and he got up to run away (R. 142-144). 
Fellow employees responded to her screams, and after running outside, they 
located, chased and subdued Mr. Garcia wi th the assistance of someone in a car 
(e.g. R. 1 67-1 68, 1 75-1 76, 185-186, 1 95, 208, 220). 
When confronted by the employees, and later by the police, Garcia said that 
while he was jogging, he stopped in the Penneys store to get a drink. He said he had 
entered the front doors, whistled at and ridden the elevator wi th Ms. Ahrens, but he 
maintained that he was not the person who had grabbed her and caused her injuries. 
After he left the store to resume his jogging, he was tackled by the store employees. 
(E.g. R. 188, 209, 226, 2 3 1 , 233, 237, 246-247). 
Garcia tried to leave after he had been detained for five or ten minutes prior to 
the arrival of the police, but was tackled and held (R . 210, 222). Once the police 
arrived, Garcia was again tackled by the police, apparently because he was being 
belligerent (R. 234). 
Garcia smelled of alcohol and said he had been drinking, but did not appear to 
be completely drunk (R. 233). He was wearing a burgundy pullover shirt, light colored 
slacks or jeans and boat shoes (R. 187, 231). 
About an hour prior to the incident in this case, a police officer was at the same 
mall as contains the Penneys, investigating another incident of some sort, but when 
he showed Mr. Garcia to the other vict im, she said that Garcia was not involved (R. 
291). 
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In convicting Mr. Garcia, Judge Murphy stated as fol lows: 
"Number one, that the defendant unlawfully entered the premises 
in question through the employee entrance, and that he did so knowingly 
and intentionally. 
I cannot and do not find beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that 
defendant entered the building with the intent to commit an assault. 
I further find that the defendant intentionally and knowingly 
remained unlawfully in the building of J.C. Penney Company in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, with the intent to commit an act wi th force and 
violence, which act caused and was intended to cause bodily injury in the 
form of physical pain and impairment of the physical condition of one 
Denese Ahrens. 
The Court therefore concludes that the defendant's guilty of count 
one, aggravated burglary, first degree felony, as charged in the 
information. The Court need not make a determination as to count two , 
which is deemed merged into count one in accordance with the 
submission of the prosecution." 
(R. 348-349).2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Marshaling the evidence demonstrates that the trial court was mistaken in 
convicting Mr. Garcia of aggravated burglary. The evidence failed to establish that 
Garcia entered or remained unlawfully in the store, and there was insufficient 
evidence that the assailant intended to injure Ms. Ahrens, whose injuries were caused 
when she fell. 
2
 A copy of the transcript pages encompassing Judge Murphy's denial 
of a motion to dismiss, and his ultimate ruling are included in the addendum to this 
brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION. 
It is elementary that due process of law, provided by the Utah Constitution and 
the United States Constitution, requires the State to prove each element of an offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt prior to obtaining a criminal conviction. See e.g. In re 
Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
Under the aggravated burglary charged in Garcia's information,3 the State should 
have proved that Garcia either entered Penneys unlawfully with the intent to commit 
an assault and caused bodily injury to Ms. Ahrens, or that Garcia remained in Penneys 
unlawfully with the intent to commit an assault and caused bodily injury to Ms. 
3
 The information read, in relevant part: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, a First Degree Felony, at 3601 South 
2700 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 17, 
1 989, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 203, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended in that the defendant, RAYMOND V. 
GARCIA, a party to the offense, entered or remained unlawfully in the 
building of J.C. Penney, Co., Inc. with the intent to commit an assault 
upon Denese Ahrens; and caused physical injury to Denese Ahrens. 
COUNT II 
ASSAULT, a Class B Misdemeanor, at 3601 South 2700 West, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about June 17, 1989, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, RAYMOND V. GARCIA, a party to the 
offense, assaulted Denese Ahrens by attempting to do bodily injury to 
Denese Ahrens. 
(R. 4). 
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Ahrens.4 A marshaling of the evidence demonstrates that the trial court was clea 
4
 Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 defines aggravated burglary as fol lows: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting, 
committ ing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another participant 
in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous weapon against any person who is not a 
participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or 
dangerous weapon. 
(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony. 
(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same 
definition as under Section 76-1-601. 
Utah Code Ann §76-6-202 defines burglary as follows: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102 defines assault as follows: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to 
do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
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mistaken in finding that the State established that Garcia remained unlawfully in the 
building or that he intended to commit an assault.5 
A. UNLAWFULLY ENTERING AND REMAINING IN THE BUILDING6 
Under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (3), "[a] person 'enters or remains unlawfully' 
in or upon premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry 
or remaining are not open to the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed 
or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion thereof." 
The evidence regarding Mr. Garcia's presence in the building is now summarized 
in detail. 
The State's witnesses assumed that Mr. Garcia likely entered the store through 
the employee entrance. The employee entrance is a main door on the ground level and 
enters from the parking lot on the south side of the building, and is unlocked at 7:30 
a.m. (R. 125, 183, 262). The employee entrance was not guarded by any security, 
and anyone who wished to could have entered the store (R. 126, 191). In stating his 
observations after having viewed the premises, Judge Murphy noted that the employee 
5
 Mr. Garcia concedes that the victim sustained bodily injury. However, 
the aggravated burglary statute requires that the injury be sustained during an 
attempt, commission or flight from a burglary, and the burglary statute requires 
proof of intent to assault. 
6
 It appears that Judge Murphy's finding that Garcia entered the store 
unlawfully but without assaultive intent is gratuitous, inasmuch as the assaultive 
intent must accompany the unlawful entry or remaining in order to establish 
burglary, and Judge Murphy found that Garcia had the assaultive intent at the time 
of his unlawful remaining. However, since the facts pertaining to Garcia's entry of 
the store bear on the lawfulness of his remaining, Garcia will marshal the evidence 
pertaining to the entry, as well as the remaining. 
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entrance door was painted with a sign reading, "employee entrance," but that the sign 
had been painted over wi th paint the same color as the door, resulting in an engraving 
indicating, "employee entrance." (R. 288). 
Ahrens first saw Garcia at about 7:50 or 7:55 a.m. standing near the drinking 
fountain and an elevator door on the second floor inside Penneys (R. 116-118). This 
area was normally accessible to customers who came to the office with complaints, 
and prospective employees (R. 272). 
Garcia got on the elevator with her and rode downstairs to the first floor (R. 
119). She was headed from clocking in upstairs to the beauty shop, which was open 
on the first floor at 8:00 (R. 165). He followed her off the elevator through a lighted 
hall and some poorly lit hallways and into the store, which was dark, except for some 
neon lights over the clothing racks and except for light from an emergency door (R. 
120, 1 38 -141 , 144-146). He put his hand over her mouth in the drapery department, 
where it was totally dark except for an exit light (R. 121 , 143). 
The retail portion of the store normally began business at 10:00 (R. 122). 
However, the beauty shop opened at 8:00 and there were no signs or barriers stopping 
those entering the beauty shop from going into the remainder of the store (R. 273-
274). There was usually a receptionist from the beauty shop who was expected to 
tell customers to stay out of the remainder of the store until it opened (R. 274). There 
was no evidence presented regarding the presence of a receptionist performing this 
function on the day in question. In describing what he viewed in inspecting the 
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premises, Judge Murphy noted the absence of any doors or instructions regulating 
traffic between the beauty salon and the other portion of the store (R. 289). 
In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Murphy characterized the "employee 
entrance" sign as "not prominent," but found that reasonable minds might differ as to 
whether a non-employee would be expected to notice the sign before going in the door 
(R. 311). 
Significantly, he found that the wording of the sign did not exclude the public 
from using the door (R. 312). 
In denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Murphy noted that Garcia had indirectly 
denied using the employee entrance,7 and that if the other testimony that he must 
have used the employee entrance to enter8 were true, Garcia's deceit about having 
used the employee's entrance could be considered proof that he knew the employee's 
entrance was not for public use (R. 312). 
Judge Murphy's speculation is not a reasonable inference from the evidence. 
There are several entries to the Penneys store (R. e.g. 263-267), and Garcia may well 
have believed that the employee entrance from the south parking lot was a "front" 
door. 
7
 This was apparently a reference to Garcia's statement to the police 
that he entered Penney's through the front door (R. 237). 
8
 The evidence established that if the store security protocol was 
fol lowed, the employee door would have been the only open door until 8:00 a.m. 
when the beauty salon entrance opened (e.g. R. 261-267). There was no evidence 
that the police actually confirmed that the other doors to Penneys were opened 
early on that date. 
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Judge Murphy found that it was apparent that the portion of the store on the 
second floor, where Ms. Ahrens first saw Garcia was "not part of the store proper, 
and not part of the retail portion of the store." (R. 289). 
While Judge Murphy acknowledged the testimony that the second floor was 
normally accessible to the public for non-retail purposes, he found that reasonable 
minds might differ regarding whether Garcia should have known that the area was 
closed to the public at the time of day and in the lighting circumstances he found on 
the second floor (R. 313). 
Judge Murphy was mistaken in this reasoning. There was no evidence 
presented that there were any signs informing Garcia that the second floor offices did 
not open at a certain t ime, and Ms. Ahrens testified that the stairwells to the second 
floor from the employee entrance were well lit, and that there were "a lot of lights" on 
the second floor (R. 126, 128). 
In addressing the lawfulness of Garcia's remaining in denying the motion to 
dismiss, Judge Murphy found that reasonable minds might conclude that Garcia should 
have known that he should have gone back out the employees' entrance, rather than 
proceeding down the elevator, which of necessity took him through the retail portion 
of the store (R. 314). 
This reasoning is f lawed, because it assumes that Garcia knew that the elevator 
led to the retail portion of the store, rather than to another exit, and that he knew that 
he was not to go through the retail portion of the store. There is nothing in evidence 
to indicate that Garcia was familiar with the elevator's destination, or that there was 
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anything to indicate to him that it was headed to a portion of the store where he 
should not go. 
Judge Murphy's finding that Garcia knowingly and intentionally entered the 
employee entrance unlawfully is contradicted by the facts that the employee entrance 
sign was not clearly visible, and did not exclude the public. 
Judge Murphy's ultimate findings that Garcia both entered and remained 
unlawfully are apparently premised on his rationale that Garcia should have known that 
the store was not yet open at the time he entered and remained (e.g. R. 313). 
However, the governing statute turns simply on whether or not the store was 
in fact open to the public, and not on what the defendant should have known. As 
noted above, under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201(3), "[a] person 'enters or remains 
unlawfully' in or upon premises when the premises or any portion thereof at the time 
of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and when the actor is not 
otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises or such portion 
thereof." 
While the evidence established that the majority of the Penneys' retail 
transactions did not begin until 10:00 and various store employees indicated that the 
store normally opened at 10:00, the store was physically open to the public at the 
time that Garcia entered. The State's own evidence proved that the employee 
entrance was freely open to anyone who wished to enter, and did not exclude the 
possibilities that Garcia or any other member of the public might have entered through 
the beauty salon or other entrance. 
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B. INTENT TO COMMIT AN ASSAULT 
The evidence regarding Mr. Garcia's intent is now summarized in detail. 
Ms. Ahren's descriptions of the encounter wi th her assailant after he came up 
behind her are as fol low: 
Q. What happened then? 
A. Then he -- he came up behind me and put his hand over my mouth. 
I couldn't breathe because his hand was up close to my nose. So we 
had a struggle. And I was -- I was dressed similar to like I am now, a 
dress and high heels. And as he pulled me backwards, towards the 
drapery department, I fell backwards. And I was struggling with his hand 
on my mouth. 
Q. What's in the drapery department? 
A. Nothing. It's totally black. 
Q. What time did the store normally open? 
A. At ten o'clock. 
Q You indicated you were falling backward. What happened then? 
A. I fell. That was the only reason I got his hand off my mouth. I 
would have never got his hand off my mouth. The grip he had on his 
hand if it wouldn't have been for falling. 
Q. What was the floor like in that area? 
A. It was cement with linoleum over the top of it. 
Q. What happened when you hit the floor? 
A. That made ~ he fell also. And it made -- made his hand come from 
my mouth. Then I just started screaming. And it must have startled 
him, because he took off running and ran out through the emergency 
door. Which was -
(R. 121-122). 
Q. Were you able to determine the color of his hair? I'm talking about 
during the time that you were struggling with this individual? 
A. During the struggling, I was hysterical and I couldn't breathe. All 
I was worried about getting his hand off of my mouth. 
(R. 143). 
Q. And you say that during the time that he put his hand on your 
mouth and you started to struggle, did you slip on the floor? 
A. I didn't slip, no. 
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Q. What caused you to fall down? 
A. Him pulling me back in the struggle. 
Q. He was pulling back at you? 
A. Right. 
Q. And then did you both fall to the floor? 
A. Right. I fell, and then it made him fall. 
Q. Did you fall on top of him, or did you fall directly on to the floor? 
A. I fell - I fell directly to the floor, but somehow he lost his footing 
and went down. 
Q. You didn't get the impression that he was trying to throw you on 
the floor or anything like that, did you? 
A. Well, it was a struggle trying to get his hand off my mouth, and 
through the struggle, we fell. 
Q. Okay. When he put his hand over your mouth was he trying to 
make you go somewhere, or was he trying to force you to the floor? 
A. I felt like it was - I was backing up. Like we were backing up. 
Q. Not like he was trying to take you to the floor; is that correct? 
A. No, I think we just fell through the struggle. I don't know that he 
(R. 144-145). After she screamed, he ran out the emergency door (R. 151). 
Judge Murphy was clearly mistaken in finding that Garcia remained unlawfully 
in Penneys wi th the intent to commit an act which was intended to and did cause 
injury to Ms. Ahrens (R. 348-349). The evidence indicated that the injuries were 
incurred when Ms. Ahrens fell down. There was no evidence that Garcia intended to, 
or made any efforts to, injure her. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the aggravated burglary conviction and order the case 
dismissed. 
DATED this L^ day of January, 1998. 
StEPHEN ft. M C C A G G H E Y / 
Attorney for Mr. Garcia / 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I, Stephen R. McCaughey, hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were hand-delivered/mailed, first-class postage pre-paid, to Jan 
Graham, Attorney General for the State of Utah, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, this J? day of January, 1998. 
STEPtffrsI R. MCCAUGHEY 
^-Attorney for Mr. Garcia 
Delivered/mailed this day of January, 1 998. 
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ADDENDUM 
Judge Murphy's ruling denying the motion to dismiss (R. 311-315) TAB 1 
Judge Murphy's ruling finding conviction (R. 348-349) TAB 2 
Tabl 
29 
1 THE COURT: YOUR MOTION RAISES ISSUES 
2 WHICH I DEEM AS HAVING BEEN MADE IMMEDIATELY AFTER 
3 THE CLOSE OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE. 
4 MR. BROWN: YES. 
5 THE COURT: AND THAT MOTION IS ADDRESSED 
6 TO THE COURT'S DETERMINATION AS A MATTER OF LAW 
7| WHETHER OR NOT REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE HAS PUT ON EVIDENCE TO 
9| STATE A PRIMA FACIE CASE AND ONE WHICH IT BELIEVED 
10 COULD ESTABLISH BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THE 
11 DEFENDANT'S GUILT. 
12 AND BASICALLY YOU RAISE IT IN TWO 
13 INCREMENTS, ONE UNDER SECTION 201-3 OF CHAPTER 6 
14 TITLE 7 6, IN THE DEFINITION OF "ENTERS OR REMAINS 
15 UNLAWFULLY." AND I DO THINK THAT IT'S NECESSARY FOR 
16 ME TO AT LEAST STATE FOR THE RECORD WHAT FACTS I 
17 BELIEVE ARE UNDISPUTED. 
18 I BELIEVE THE FACTS THAT ARE UNDISPUTED ARE 
19 THAT THE SIGN ON THE DOOR STATING EMPLOYEES ENTRANCE 
20 IS NOT A PROMINENT SIGN IN THE SENSE THAT IT'S LIT 
21 UP WITH BELLS AND WHISTLES AND NEON. 
22 HOWEVER, REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER 
23 WHETHER SOMEONE WALKING UP TO THAT DOOR SHOULD SEE 
24 IT AS THEY PLACE THEIR HAND UPON THE LEVER IN THE 
25 HANDLE TO OPEN THE ACCOMPANYING DOOR. 
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I THINK IT'S ALSO AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT 
THE SIGN, EMPLOYEE ENTRANCE, BY IT'S LITTLE WORDING 
IS NOT EXCLUSIONARY TO THE PUBLIC. BUT I DO BELIEVE 
THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER AS TO WHETHER OR 
NOT THE STATE HAS ESTABLISHED BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT 
REMAINED UNLAWFULLY UPON THE PREMISES, AND EVIDENCE 
THAT HE ENTERED UNLAWFULLY UPON THE PREMISES. 
AND I WANT TO JUST POINT OUT SOME FACTORS 
IN THE EVIDENCE THAT A FACT-FINDER COULD DETERMINE 
OR COULD CONSIDER. AND THAT IS, THERE IS SOME 
EVIDENCE THAT AT SOME POINT IN THE INVESTIGATION 
DEFENDANT DENIED, IN EFFECT — NOT DIRECTLY, BUT 
INDIRECTLY — USE OF THE EMPLOYEE ENTRANCE DOOR. 
AND IF YOU CREDIT THAT DENIAL, AND YET 
CREDIT THE TESTIFY THAT IN FACT THAT WAS THE WAY HE 
HAD GOTTEN IN, THAT THE DEFENDANT THEREFORE KNEW 
THAT HE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THERE OR SHOULD NOT 
HAVE GONE IN THROUGH THAT ENTRANCE. 
ADDITIONALLY, I THINK REASONABLE MINDS 
COULD DIFFER AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN APPARENT TO A PERSON WHO GOES THROUGH THE 
EMPLOYEE ENTRANCE AND WHO IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE, GOES 
UP THE STAIRCASE TO THE SECOND FLOOR AT 
APPROXIMATELY SOMETIME BETWEEN 7:45 A.M. AND 8 00 
A.M. AND EMERGES ON THE SECOND FLOOR, SEEING THE 
LIGHTING CONDITIONS, THE NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
UP THERE, REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER WHETHER IT 
SHOULD BE APPARENT THEN TO A PERSON WHO IS NOT AN 
EMPLOYEE THAT THEY DON'T BELONG THERE, AND THAT THAT 
IS NOT OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. 
MR. BROWN: EXCUSE ME, COULD I INTERRUPT 
THERE? THE POINT IS, IT IS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC UNDER 
THE TESTIMONY OF THE SECURITY PERSON BECAUSE HE SAID 
THAT PUBLIC DOES GO UP THERE, AND IT'S NOT — IT'S 
NOT CLOSED TO THE PUBLIC. 
THE PUBLIC GOES UP THERE TO MAKE CREDIT 
APPLICATIONS, AND I THINK HE LISTED A COUPLE OF 
OTHER THINGS THAT IT WAS OPEN TO THE PUBLIC FOR. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND, BUT I THINK WHEN 
YOU COMBINE THE NATURE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES UP THERE 
WITH THE TIME OF THE DAY AND THE LIGHTING CONDITIONS 
THERE, THAT REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER AS TO 
WHETHER OR NOT IT SHOULD BE APPARENT TO SOMEONE, IF 
THEY ARE NOT AN EMPLOYEE, THEY DON'T BELONG THERE. 
AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE AN 
EMPLOYEE OR CUSTOMER, THAT — EXCUSE ME, IF THEY ARE 
A CUSTOMER THEY DON'T BELONG ANYPLACE IN THOSE 
CONFINES, WHETHER IT BE THE FIRST OR SECOND FLOOR AT 
THAT TIME OF THE DAY. 
CM 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE YOU RAISED UNDER 
202-1, THE LITERAL LANGUAGE INDICATES THAT THE 
ALTERNATIVE, REMAINING UNLAWFULLY ON THE PREMISES IS 
A FACTOF THAT HAS BEEN MET, OR AT LEAST REASONABLE 
MINDS COULD DIFFER AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THAT ASPECT 
OF 202-3 HAS BEEN MET IN THIS CASE. 
AND EVEN ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF YOU WOULD 
ASSUME AS A FACT-FINDER THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS 
LAWFULLY ON THE PREMISES, THAT REASONABLE MINDS 
COULD DEFFER AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHES THAT EVEN THOUGH HE MAY HAVE BEEN 
LAWFULLY ON THE PREMISES, THAT HE THEREFORE 
DETERMINED THAT HE WAS NOT LAWFULLY ON THE PREMISES 
AND COULD NOT LAWFULLY REMAIN. 
THE DIFFERENT ROUTES THAT THE DEFENDANT 
COULD HAVE TAKEN IS A FACTOR WHICH MUST BE 
CONSIDERED UNDER THE STANDARD OF WHETHER OR NOT 
REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER*. AND THAT IS, THAT IF 
YOU ASSUME THE DEFENDANT WAS LAWFULLY ON THE 
PREMISES, AND YOU ASSUME THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT 
FACTS THAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPARENT AT SOME TIME 
THAT HE WAS NO LONGER LAWFULLY ON THE PREMISES, THAT 
A FACT-FINDER COULD DETERMINE WITH SOME 
REASONABLENESS THAT THE WAY OUT WAS TO GO BACK DOWNS 
STAIRCASE, AND OUT THE EMPLOYEE ENTRANCE DOOR, 
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RATHER THAN TAKING THE ELEVATOR DOWN, WHICH OPENS 
ONLY IN THE STORE PROPER. 
I DON'T MEAN TO RAMBLE ON AND ON, BUT I 
WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT THE RECORD IS CLEAR ON A 
NUMBER OF FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS THAT COULD BE MADE 
BY REASONABLE MINDS IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR 
NOT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE CASE TO GO 
TO THE FACT-FINDER. 
AND WITH THOSE RAMBLINGS IN MIND AS A 
REASON FOR THE COURT'S RULING, I'M GOING THE DENY 
THE MOTION TO DISMISS, WHICH IS PREMISED ON 201-03 
AND 201-2. 
MR. BLAYLOCK, DO YOU WANT TO BEGIN YOUR 
CLOSING STATEMENT. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. YOUR 
HONOR, THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY. I THINK THERE'S BEEN — THERE'S ALREADY 
BEEN SOME DISCUSSION OF THE ELEMENT OF AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY. THE QUESTION IS, WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON 
COMMITS A BURGLARY, THEN WHETHER OR NOT AGGRAVATED 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST. 
A BURGLARY IS COMMITTED WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL 
ENTERS OR REMAINS UNLAWFULLY IN THE BUILDING OR ANY 
PORTION OF A BUILDING WITH INTENT TO COMMIT A FELONY 
OR THEFT OR COMMIT AN ASSAULT ON ANY PERSON. 
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THE COURT: THAT'S THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
LINE-UP? 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I BELIEVE THAT'S ALREADY 
OFERED. 
THE COURT: NO, I DON'T THINK IT HAS BEEN. 
MR. BROWN: I DON'T THINK IT WAS. 
THE CLERK: I HAVE IT AS OFFERED AND 
RECEIVED. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: I HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
THE COURT: 3-S IS RECEIVED THEN. WOULD 
YOU COLLECT THOSE FOR ME, GENE, AND BRING THEM BACK 
HERE. 
BAILIFF: YES, SIR. I SURE WILL. 
THE COURT: WE'LL BE IN RECESS. 
(COURT IN RECESS NOW AT 12:05 P.M.) 
(COURT RESUMES SESSIN AT 1:00 P.M.) 
THE COURT: THIS IS STATE OF UTAH VERSUS 
RAYMOND VICTOR GARCIA, CR 89-1440. MR. GARCIA'S 
PRESENT, ALONG WITH HIS COUNSEL MR. BROWN. MR. 
BLAYLOCK HERE FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. THIS IS THE 
TIME SET FOR THE COURT TO RENDER IT'S DECISION. 
MUCH OF THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS 
CONFLICTING, BUT I FIND FROM THE EVIDENCE AND BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THE FOLLOWING: 
NUMBER ONE, THAT THE DEFENDANT UNLAWFULLY 
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ENTERED THE PREMISES IN QUESTION THROUGH THE 
EMPLOYEE ENTRANCE, AND THAT HE DID SO KNOWINGLY AND 
INTENTIONALLY. 
I CANNOT AND DO NOT FIND BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT DEFENDANT ENTERED 
THE BUILDING WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT AN ASSAULT. 
I FURTHER FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY AND KNOWINGLY REMAINED UNLAWFULLY IN 
THE BUILDING OF J. C PENNEY COMPANY IN SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, WITH THE INTENT TO COMMIT AN 
ACT WITH FORCE AND VIOLENCE, WHICH ACT CAUSED AND 
WAS INTENDED TO CAUSE BODILY INJURY IN THE FORM OF 
PHYSICAL PAIN AND IMPAIRMENT OF THE PHYSICAL 
CONDITION OF ONE DENESE AHRENS. 
THE COURT THEREFORE CONCLUDES THAT THE 
DEFENDANT'S GUILTY OF COUNT ONE, AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY, FIRST DEGREE FELONY, AS CHARGED IN THE 
INFORMATION. THE COURT NEED NOT MAKE A 
DETERMINATION AS TO COUNT TWO, WHICH IS DEEMED 
MERGED INTO COUNT ONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
SUBMISSION OF THE PROSECUTION. 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WILL BE ENTERED 
THEREON, AND WE NEED TO SET A DATE FOR SENTENCING. 
APRIL 2ND WILL BE THE TIME SET FOR SENTENCING. 
MR. GARCIA, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE 
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